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Abstract Following Bossert (1995), we consider a model where personal income depends on
two different characteristics: skills and effort. Luttens (2010) introduces claims that individuals
have over aggregate income and that only depend on the effort they exert. Moreover, he proposes
redistribution mechanisms in which solidarity is based on changes in a lower bound on what
every individual deserves according to these claims: the so-called minimal rights (O’Neill 1982).
A debatable consequence in one of Luttens’ mechanisms is that “the poorest individuals might up
with a negative income” (Luttens 2010); that is, this mechanism does not satisfy participation,
which turns out to be incompatible with claims feasibility, under Luttens’ assumptions. We
present a new solidarity axiom that is compatible both with participation and claims feasibility,
and we provide a mechanism satisfying these properties and our new additive solidarity axiom.
Moreover, our mechanism satisfies additional properties, as priority, or respect of minimal rights.
Keywords Redistribution mechanism, minimal rights, solidarity, participation, claims feasibility
JEL classification C71, D63, D71 * **
1. Introduction
We suppose that inequalities in welfare among individuals in a society are determined
by two different factors or characteristics: skills and effort. The difference between
these characteristics is that individuals are completely responsible for the inequalities
due to differences in effort, that do not deserve compensation (effort reflects, for
instance, the number of hours that a person decides to work). Nevertheless, there are
other circumstances, which are beyond the control of the individuals, that deserve
compensation (different innate skills or talents, economic status, historical inequality
due to race, gender etc.).
The aim of fair income redistribution is to guarantee an equal income for individuals
exerting the same effort (the principle of compensation) and to perform equal income
transfers to individuals with equal skills (the principle of natural reward). It is well
known that, in many contexts, a redistribution mechanism satisfying both the principle
of compensation and the principle of natural reward simultaneously does not exist. As
a result, the literature has concentrated on dealing with such trade-off between both
principles. Notably, most contributions have opted for a weakening of the principle of
natural reward (see, for instance, Fleurbaey 1994; Bossert 1995; Bossert and Fleurbaey
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1996; Iturbe-Ormaetxe 1997; Tungodden 2005). Other approaches have opted for
strengthening compensation with respect to the principle of solidarity, a principle
with a long tradition in the theory of justice.1 In accordance, Bossert and Fleurbaey
(1996) and Iturbe-Ormaetxe (1997) present two modified versions of the solidarity
axiom (additive solidarity and multiplicative solidarity) to characterize the egalitarian
equivalent mechanisms (Pazner and Schmeidler 1978) and the family of proportionally
adjusted equivalent mechanisms (Iturbe-Ormaetxe 1997), respectively. A central notion
on fairness is the No-Envy property, suggested by Foley (1967) and analyzed by Kolm
(1972), Panzer and Schmeidler (1974) and Varian (1974).
We use the quasi-linear model developed in Bossert (1995), with utility functions
taking the form
ui = xi+ v(yi,zi),
where v(yi,zi) is described as agent pre-tax income, xi is an income transfer, and ui is
the final income after redistribution. As usual in this model, we consider that the total
amount to be distributed is Ω= 0; that is, we consider a redistribution problem.
An important feature of this model is that the redistribution of resources is based only
on the set of characteristics that deserve compensation. Furthermore, such compensation
is assigned according to a solidarity basis (Rawls 1971): changes in these characteristics
should affect each individual’s final utility in the same direction. Accordingly, Bossert
(1995) proposes the property of additive solidarity, which is based on the idea that
individuals should benefit equally from variations in the skills profile.
In a recent paper, Luttens (2010) includes a new element into the model, by defining
a claims function that depends on the individual’s effort z but does not depend on the
individual’s skill y, “hence, two individuals with identical effort, but different skills
(different pre-tax incomes) have identical claims in the redistribution problem” (Luttens
2010). Within this approach, Luttens makes a bridge between the conflicting claims
literature and the Bossert’s taxation model (Bossert 1995) with quasi-linear preferences
previously mentioned. Moreover, he proposes a lower bound in the individuals’ welfare
based on their claims function, namely the minimal rights lower bound,2 and defines
a strengthening of the additive solidarity principle: an income gain (loss), generated
by a change in the skills profile, is shared on the basis of the information contained in
changes of this lower bound.
The redistribution mechanism proposed by Luttens (2010) fails to respect the mini-
mal rights lower bound on which it is based; that is, for some individuals the income
after redistribution might be lower than her minimal right. Moreover, as the author
suggests, “a debatable property is that the poorest individuals might end up with a
negative income after redistribution when R (the aggregate income) is sufficiently low.”
This property corresponding to the notion of participation (Maniquet 1998) “captures
the idea of protecting high-skilled agents in the sense that the low-skilled agent com-
pensation should not be carried out by imposing on the former agents so long labor
time that they end up worse off than if they withdrew from the economy” (see also
1 See Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011) for a comprehensive summary of this literature. We follow this paper
for notation and definitions.
2 This bound was introduced by O’Neill (1982) in the context of claims problems.
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Fleurbaey and Maniquet 2011). In other contexts, this non-negativity condition has also
been adopted. For instance, “in production models, non-negativity (participation) takes
care of the “slavery” problem, by avoiding situations in which an agent would rather
opt out of the economy than participate in the production process” (Fleurbaey 2008).
Given a change in the skill profile, a planner can perform a redistribution by following a
solidarity property, but this should not come at the cost of an agent ending up with a
negative income after redistribution. Once an agent ends up with a zero income after
redistribution, she no longer needs to take part in performing solidarity. Luttens (2010),
in order to solve this problem, defines an alternative mechanism satisfying participation,
at the expense of losing claims feasibility.
We are interested in keeping both properties along with the axiom of respect of the
minimal rights. Then, we propose a refinement of Luttens’ mechanisms which makes
compatible participation and claims feasibility by weakening the solidarity condition.
Note that minimal rights suppose a very weak notion of guarantee: it requires that each
individual receives at least what is left of the resources after the other claims have been
fully compensated, or zero if this amount is negative. So, if the claims are high enough
with respect to the aggregate income, no individual guarantee exists at all.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and introduce
the basic definitions. Section 3 proposes and characterizes our respect of minimal
rights-based egalitarian mechanism. Some final remarks close the paper in Section 4.
An appendix gathers the proof of our characterization result and the independence of
the axioms used in this characterization.
2. The model
2.1 Fair monetary compensation model
Let us denote by N = {1, . . . ,n} the finite population of size n≥ 2. Individuals are distin-
guished by two characteristics: skill and effort. Differences in skill elicit compensation.
The individual’s skill is represented by a real non-negative number y ∈Y, where Y is an
interval of R+ = {x ∈R : x≥ 0}. The skills profile is the vector yN = (y1, . . . ,yn) ∈Yn.
The effort is also denoted by a non-negative real number z ∈ Z, where Z is an interval
of R+. The effort profile is zN = (z1, . . . ,zn) ∈ Zn. So, each individual is identified by
the pair of non-negative real numbers (xi,yi) ∈ Y×Z, specifying her skill and effort,
respectively. Without loss of generality, throughout the work we assume that individuals
are ranked with respect to the effort they exert: z1 ≥ z2 ≥ . . .≥ zn. An economy consists
of the pair of skill and effort profiles, e= (yN ,zN) ∈ Yn×Zn. Let E denote the set of
economies, E ⊆ Yn×Zn.
Given an economy e = (yN ,zN) ∈ E , a pre-tax income function (identical for all
individuals), v : Y×Z→ R+, associates to each individual (yi,zi) a monetary income
v(yi,zi) that depends on her skill and effort. It is supposed that function v is strictly
increasing in y. The total sum of pre-tax incomes is denoted by R= ∑i∈Nv(yi,zi).
Differences in individuals’ skills are compensated by an amount xi of a transferable
resource (money). Differences in effort do not elicit compensation. An allocation
xN = (x1, . . . ,xn) ∈ Rn is the vector defined by transferable resources xi. We assume
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that the total amount to be distributed is Ω= 0, so that we are looking at a redistribution
problem (total subsidies coincide with total taxes). Then, an allocation is feasible
whenever ∑
i∈N
xi = 0.
We assume, as in Luttens (2010), that individuals, because of the effort they exert,
have some claim on the total pre-tax income R. Let g : Z→ R++ be the claims function
that assigns to each individual (yi,zi) a claim g(zi) that depends on the individual’s effort
only. We assume that function g(z) is continuous and strictly increasing in z.We denote
the total sum of claims by C = ∑i∈Ng(zi), and C−i = ∑ j 6=i∈Ng(z j). The redistribution
problem will be a conflicting claims problem wheneverC > R. Let us denote the claims
vector of an economy e= (yN ,zN) by gˆ= (g(z1),g(z2), . . . ,g(zn)).
A (redistribution) mechanism is a function S : E ×Rn→ Rn such that for all e ∈ E ,
and any claims vector gˆ, S(e, gˆ) is a feasible allocation, that is
∑
i∈N
Si(e, gˆ) = 0.
It is assumed, as in Bossert (1995), that individuals preferences are characterized by
(quasi-linear) utility functions, u : R×Y×Z→ R, which are defined as follows:
u(xi,yi,zi) = xi+ v(yi,zi).
Utility represents the final income after redistribution. It is clear that, as ∑
i∈N
xi = 0,
∑
i∈N
u(xi,yi,xi) = ∑
i∈N
v(yi,zi) = R.
As the compensation xi each agent receives will depend on the claims vector, we shall
denote the utility function of individual (yi,zi) by ui(e, gˆ),
ui(e, gˆ) = xi(gˆ)+ v(yi,zi).
We now introduce some notation that will be helpful. Given two economies e= (yN ,zN)
and e′ = (y′N ,zN), which only differ in skills profiles, and any claims vector gˆ, changes
in any function or variable are denoted by the difference operator ∆. Then, ∆h =
h(e′, gˆ)−h(e, gˆ). Note that, since the effort is the same in both economies, the claims
vector also coincides. This notation will be used to represent changes in the utility
function, u, the minimal rights vector, m, as well as changes in the total pre-tax income,
R (although R does not depends on the claims vector gˆ).
2.2 Axioms
Before introducing the axioms, we provide the definition of the minimal rights lower
bound (O’Neill 1982). This bound guarantees to each individual the amount that is
left when the rest of the individuals have received their claim, or zero if this amount
is negative. Associated with this bound, respect of minimal rights states that each
individual should receive at least her minimal right (this axiom is a consequence of
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efficiency, non-negativity and claims boundedness combined (Thomson 2003)).
Definition 1. Minimal rights (O’Neill 1982). For each economy e= (yN ,zN) ∈ E , and
each claims vector gˆ, the minimal rights vector, m ∈ Rn+, is defined by mi = mi(e, gˆ) =
min

g(zi), [R−C−i]+

, i ∈ N, where [a]+ =max{0,a} .
Axiom 1. Respect of minimal rights (RMR). For each economy e= (yN ,zN) ∈ E , each
claims vector gˆ, and each i ∈ N, ui(e, gˆ)≥ mi(e, gˆ).
The following axiom, participation, states that no individual can incur losses, i.e.
when R converges to zero, all incomes should also converge to zero. Moreover, note that
before redistribution the pre-tax income of each individual vi = v(yi,zi) is non-negative,
so after redistribution this condition should be maintained. Note that this property is
implied by the axiom respect of minimal rights.
Axiom 2. Participation (P,Maniquet 1998). For each economy e= (yN ,zN) ∈ E , each
claims vector gˆ, and each i ∈ N, ui(e, gˆ)≥ 0.
Next, we present the axioms characterizing our mechanism. The first one, claims
feasibility is a standard assumption which requires that when the aggregate pre-tax
income (resources) equals the aggregate claim, then each individual’s utility equals her
claim.
Axiom 3. Claims Feasibility (CF). For each economy e = (yN ,zN) ∈ E , and each
claims vector gˆ, if R=C, then ui(e, gˆ) = g(zi) for all i ∈ N.
The following property (Luttens 2010) requires an equal treatment of two individuals
in the allocation of the extra resources when their minimal rights change equally.
Definition 2. Additive Solidarity for equal changes in minimal rights (AS∗, Luttens
2010). Given two economies e = (yN ,zN),e′ = (y′N ,zN) ∈ E , that only differ in skills
profiles, and a claims vector gˆ, if ∆mi = ∆m j, then ∆ui = ∆u j.
Finally, the following axiom establishes that the changes in the resources should be
shared among those individuals with changes in their minimal rights.
Axiom 4. Priority (PRI, Luttens 2010). Given two economies e = (yN ,zN),e′ =
(y′N ,zN) ∈ E , that only differ in skills profiles, and a claims vector gˆ, if N1 = {i ∈
N : ∆mi 6= 0} 6=∅, and ∆mi = ∆R, for all i ∈ N1, then ∑i∈N1∆ui = ∆R; or, equivalently,
∆u j = 0, for all j /∈ N1.
Luttens (2010) proposes and characterizes two different mechanisms. One of them
with the axioms AS∗, PRI (he names both axioms together as minimal rights-based
solidarity) and CF; the other mechanism with AS∗, PRI and P. As a consequence,
minimal rights-based solidarity, claims feasibility and participation are incompatible
axioms. So, when imposing Luttens’ minimal rights-based solidarity together with
claims feasibility, a redistribution mechanism also fails the respect minimal rights axiom.
Luttens argues that “this incompatibility is due to AS∗ rather than priority.” We agree
on this argument and in order to obtain compatibility we just modify the AS∗ axiom.
The following example will be useful to better observe what happens with the
minimal rights-based solidarity axioms when participation is required.
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Example 1. Let us consider an economy e, with n = 4 individuals such that gˆ =
(80,70,50,30). As previously mentioned, participation implies ui = 0 for all i, when
R′ = 0. In this case, the minimal rights vector is m= (0,0,0,0). If, due to a change in
the skills profile, we now have R= 150, then all minimal rights are still null, so axiom
AS∗ implies an equal sharing of the extra resources, that is ui = 37.5 for all i. Then,
individual 4 ends up at a welfare level that is above what she deserves (her claim) and
the other individuals are below their claims. Thus, claims feasibility is not met.
What is the problem in the above example? In our opinion, the “problem” occurs
when the minimal right equals to zero, and it is originated because of the [ ]+ operator
that appears in the definition of minimal rights. To see this, observe that whenever
R≤ 150 all minimal rights are null, but there is a significant difference before applying
the [ ]+ operator:
m1 =min

80, [0]+

= 0, m2 =min

70, [−10]+

= 0
m3 =min

50, [−30]+

= 0, m4 =min

40, [−50]+

= 0.
In order to prevent this situation (individuals with a negative income after redistribution,
or individuals above their claims, when it is not possible to satisfy all claims), we
present the following modification of the additive solidarity axiom, which introduces an
equal treatment of two individuals when their minimal rights change equally and both
individuals have a positive income after redistribution.
Axiom 5. Additive Solidarity for equal significant changes in minimal rights (AS∗∗).
Given two economies e= (yN ,zN),e′ = (y′N ,zN) ∈ E , that only differ in skills profiles,
and a claims vector gˆ, such that R′ <R, if ∆mi =∆m j, then u j(e′, gˆ) = [u j(e, gˆ)+∆ui]+ .
It is important to note that whenever u j(e′, gˆ)> 0, then AS∗∗ coincides with AS∗.
So, the modification of this axiom only has relevance for values of R sufficiently low.
Specifically, when an individual already receives a zero income after redistribution, that
individual should no longer be affected by a further deterioration of the skills profile in
society. As mentioned in Luttens (2010) “our ethical intuition may lead us to consider
a minimal amount of redistribution, that we at least want to perform. Suppose that
the poorest in society could not satisfy their basic needs when they receive a negative
income after redistribution. Society wants to exclude this possibility in every situation
by incorporating the requirement of a non-negative income after redistribution for all
individuals in the construction of the redistribution mechanism.”
The following example shows the different result we obtain, by applying AS∗∗
instead of AS∗, in the situation of Example 1.
Example 2. (continues from Example 1) Note that now, when applying AS∗∗ (R′ =
0, R = 150), an egalitarian distribution is not necessarily obtained for R, since from
u = (0,0,0,0) not necessarily all increments must be equal in order to fulfill AS∗∗.
In fact, to obtain the utility vector in R = 150, we can begin with R0 = 230, and
claims feasibility implies u= (80,70,50,30). In this case, the minimal rights vector is
m = (80,70,50,30). If, due to a change in the skills profile, we now have R1 = 200,
then m= (50,40,20,0), so axiom AS∗∗ implies an equal sharing of the lost resources,
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that is u= (72.5,62.5,42.5,22.5). Now, consider that the resources are R2 = 180, then
m= (30,20,0,0), so by AS∗∗ and PRI,we obtain u= (65.83,55.83,35.83,22.5).When
R3= 160, thenm= (10,0,0,0), so AS∗∗ and PRI imply u= (55.83,45.83,35.83,22.5).
Finally, for R4 = 150, we know m = (0,0,0,0), and AS∗∗ and PRI imply that u =
(45.83,45.83,35.83,22.5) which differs from the egalitarian proposal obtained under
AS∗.
3. A respect-of-minimal-rights egalitarian mechanism
This section provides an alternative to Luttens’ mechanisms, which is based on the
fulfillment of the respect of minimal rights axiom. Our main result characterizes this
mechanism in terms of claims feasibility, priority and our new axiom of additive
solidarity for equal significant changes in minimal rights. It must be noticed that given
an economy e and a claims vector gˆ, associated to any redistribution mechanism S, the
utility each individual obtains is
ui(e, gˆ) = S(e, gˆ)+ v(yi,zi).
Observe that the axioms are formulated in terms of utilities, instead of the redistribution
mechanism.
Our mechanism has an egalitarian objective, which is constrained in terms of the
minimal right of each individual: that is, individuals with identical minimal rights
increase their utility in the same level. Figure 1 shows how slopes of such individuals
coincide. Observe that when the aggregate pre-tax income R is large enough (R≥C−4),
then all individuals increase their utility at the same rate.
R
ui
0
g(z4)
g(z3)
g(z2)
g(z1)
C−1 C−2 C−3 C−4 Cg(z2) + g(z3) − 2g(z4)g(z2) − g(z3)
Figure 1. Utilities provided by SRMRE (respect-of-minimal-rights egalitarian mechanism). The
top utility level corresponds to the individual with greatest effort, u1, then u2, u3 and
u4.
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Definition 3. The respect-of-minimal-rights egalitarian mechanism SRMRE allocates
resources for each e ∈ E , each claims vector gˆ and each i ∈ N, as follows:
(xi)SRMRE =−v(yi,zi)+di(gˆ,R),
where di(gˆ,R) is defined by:
(i) R≥C−n:
di(gˆ,R) = g(zi)+
R−C
n
∀i ∈ N
(ii) C−k ≤ R≤C−(k+1):
di(gˆ,R) =

di(gˆ,C−(k+1)) ∀i≥ k+1
di(gˆ,C−(k+1))+
R−C−(k+1)
k
∀i< k+1
(iii) Gn−1 ≤ R≤C−1:
di(gˆ,R) = di(gˆ,C−1)+
R−C−1
n
∀i ∈ N
(iv) Gn+1−k ≤ R≤ Gn+2−k, k = 2,3, . . . ,n−2,
di(gˆ,R) =

0 ∀i≥ n+2− k
di(gˆ,Gn+2−k)+
R−Gn+2−k
k
∀i< n+2− k
where Gs =
s−1
∑
i=2
g(zi)− (s−2)g(zs−1).
Theorem 1. A redistribution mechanism S coincides with SRMRE if and only if S satisfies
CF, AS∗∗ and PRI.
Proof. See Appendix A1.
The independence of the axioms that appear in Theorem 1 is shown in Appendix A2.
The following proposition, which can be straightforwardly obtained from the proof of
Theorem 1, highlights the fact that our solution meets the boundedness on which it is
based. On the other hand, as we have mentioned, respect of minimal rights implies the
participation property.
Proposition 1. SRMRE satisfies RMR and P.
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4. Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed redistribution problems by means of a lower bound on
what individuals deserve. We have modified the mechanism proposed by Luttens (2010)
so that our proposal not only makes claims feasibility and participation compatible,
but also it fulfills the bound on which is based: respect of minimal rights (RMR). Our
proposal behaves as the CF-mechanism of Luttens for a large level of resources. But
we obtain that for a small level of resources, (i) no-one can incur a negative income,
and (ii) no-one can receive more than their claim when the resources are not enough to
satisfy the aggregate claim (claim-boundedness), two usual requirements in conflicting
claims problems. Figure 1 shows how our mechanism works, where the horizontal and
vertical axes represent different levels of the resources and the total income received by
each individual, in a four-individual problem, respectively.
Finally an interesting ongoing issue is to analyze the behavior of this kind of
egalitarian mechanism whenever other lower bounds considered in the literature are
used.
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Appendix
A1. Proof of Theorem 1
Given an economy e = (yN ,zN), and a claims vector gˆ, we define the economy e′ =
(y′N ,zN) where y′N is chosen such that R′ =C. Since the efforts does not change, the
claims vector of this new economy is gˆ. Note that, for each i ∈ N, mi(e′, gˆ) = g(zi).
Hence theCF axiom implies that the ”initial income” is ui(e′, gˆ) = g(zi), for each i ∈N.
One of the following situations occurs:
(i) R≥C
For each i ∈ N, R−C−i ≥C−C−i = g(zi). Thus, mi(e, gˆ) = g(zi), and mi(e, gˆ)−
mi(e′, gˆ) = 0. By AS∗∗, ui(e, gˆ) = g(zi)+ R−Cn , which coincides with (i) of Defi-
nition 3.
(ii) C−n ≤ R<C
For each i ∈ N, R−C−i = (R−C−n) + (C−n −C−i) = (R−C−n) + (g(zi)−
g(zn)) = (R−C)+g(zi) < g(zi), and R−C−i ≥C−n−C−i = g(zi)−g(zn) ≥ 0.
Thus, mi(e, gˆ) = (R−C)+g(zi). Hence, mi(e, gˆ)−mi(e′, gˆ) = R−R′ = R−C.
By AS∗∗, ui(e, gˆ) = g(zi)+ R−Cn , which coincides with (i) of Definition 3.
(iii) C−(n−1) ≤ R<C−n
Consider now the economy e′ = (y′N ,zN) where y′N is chosen such that R′ =C−n.
Since the efforts does not change, the claims vector of this new economy is gˆ.
From (ii) we know that ui(e′, gˆ) = g(zi)+ C−n−Cn . For each i ∈ N, R−C−i = (R−
C−n)+(C−n−C−i) = (R−C−n)+(g(zi)−g(zn)) = (R−C)+g(zi)< g(zi). For
each i≤ n−1, R−C−i ≥ 0, and R−C−n < 0. Thus, mi(e, gˆ) = (R−C)+g(zi) for
each i≤ n−1 and mn(e, gˆ) = 0. Hence, mi(e, gˆ)−mi(e′, gˆ) = (R−C)+g(zi)−
(C−n−C+ g(zi)) = R−C−n, for each i ≤ n− 1 and mn(e, gˆ)−mn(e′, gˆ) = 0.
By PRI and AS∗∗, ui(e, gˆ) = ui(e′, gˆ)+ R−C−nn−1 , for each i≤ n−1 and un(e, gˆ) =
un(e′, gˆ) which coincides with (ii) of Definition 3.
(iv) C−(k−1) ≤ R<C−k, k = 2,3, . . . ,n−1
The proof of this case is completely analogous to that in (iii), just by considering
the economy e′ = (y′N ,zN) where y′N is chosen such that R′ =C−k.
(v) Gn−1 ≤ R<C−1
We consider the economy e′ = (y′N ,zN) where y′N is chosen such that R′ =C−1.
Since the efforts does not change, the claims vector of this new economy is gˆ. For
each i∈N, R−C−i = (R−C−1)+(C−1−C−i) = (R−C−1)+(g(zi)−g(z1))< 0.
Thus, mi(e, gˆ) = 0. Hence, mi(e, gˆ)−mi(e′, gˆ) = 0. By AS∗∗, ui(e, gˆ) = ui(e′, gˆ)+
R−C−1
n , which coincides with (iii) of Definition 3.
(vi) Gn+1−k ≤ R< Gn+2−k, for k = 2,3, . . . ,n−2
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Finally, consider the economy e′ = (y′N ,zN) where y′N is chosen such that R′ =
Gn+2−k. Since the efforts does not change, the claims vector of this new economy
is gˆ. For each i∈N, R−C−i < 0. Thus,mi(e, gˆ)= 0. Hence,mi(e, gˆ)−mi(e′, gˆ)=
0. By AS∗∗, ui(e, gˆ) = ui(e′, gˆ) +
R−Gn+2−k
k , for each i ≤ n+ 2− (k+ 1) and
ui(e, gˆ) = 0, otherwise, which coincides with (iv) of Definition 3.
Finally, it is immediate to observe that the utility functions obtained from the
redistribution mechanism SRMRE satisfy the required axioms.
A2. Axioms Independence
In the next examples we show that the axioms in Theorem 1 are independent. In all
of them, there are three individuals which are decreasingly ordered, as usually, that is,
g1 = g(z1)≥ g2 = g(z2)≥ g3 = g(z3).
(i) A mechanism fulfillingCF, AS∗∗ and not PRI.
Let Sa the mechanism defined by:
(a) If R<C and m3 < m2 = m1 < g2, then ui = R3 .
(b) Sa = SRMRE , otherwise.
It is clear thatCF and AS∗∗ are fulfilled.
Nonetheless, Sa does no satisfy PRI, as the next numerical example shows.
Consider two economies e = (yN ,zN), e′ = (y′N ,zN) ∈ E , such that R = 3, R′ =
12, and gˆ= (9,9,1). Then, u(e, gˆ) = (1,1,1), m(e, gˆ) = (0,0,0), and u(e′, gˆ) =
(4,4,4), m(e′, gˆ) = (1,1,0). So Sa does not satisfy PRI.
(ii) A mechanism fulfillingCF , PRI and not AS∗∗.
Let Sb the mechanism defined by:
u1 = R−u2−u3, u2 = m2, u3 = m3.
It is clear that Sb satisfiesCF and PRI.
Nonetheless, Sb does no satisfy AS∗∗ as the next numerical example shows.
Consider two economies e= (yN ,zN), e′ = (y′N ,zN) ∈ E , such that R= 12, R′ =
15, and gˆ= (10,9,1). Then, u(e, gˆ) = (11,1,0),m(e, gˆ) = (2,1,0), and u(e′, gˆ) =
(11,4,0), m(e′, gˆ) = (5,4,0). So Sb does not satisfy AS∗∗.
(iii) A mechanism fulfilling PRI, AS∗∗ and notCF.
Let Sc the mechanism defined by:
(a) If m3 < m2 = m1 ≤ g2, then u3 = g3, and u2 = u1 = R−g32 .
(b) If m3 < m2 = g2 < m1, then u3 = g3, u2 =
3g2−g3
2 , and u1 = R−u2−u3.
(c) Sc = SRMRE , otherwise.
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It is clear that PRI and AS∗∗ are fulfilled.
Nonetheless, Sc does no satisfy CF as the next numerical example shows. Con-
sider an economy e = (yN ,zN) ∈ E , such that R = 21, and gˆ = (14,6,1). Then,
m(e, gˆ) = (14,6,1) and u(e, gˆ) = (11.5,8.5,1). So Sc does not satisfyCF .
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